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0. Introduction 
G. Lakoff 1971;339 credits K. Burt with observing 'that the 
future auxiliary will ca.n be deleted in vhat looks like a very 
strange set of environments in terms of presupposition-free syntactic 
structure.' Some examples he gives: 
(1) a, The Yankees will play the Red Sox tomorrow. 
b. The Yankees play the Red Sox tomorrow. 
c. Th.e Yankees will play vell tomorrow. 
d. *The Yankees play well tomorrow. 
e. I will 	get my paycheck tomorrow. 
r. I 	get my paycheck tomorrow. 
g. I will get a cold tomorrow. 
h, *I get a cold tomorrow. 
Lakoff concludes that 'in terms of presupposition-free syntax 
no general principle for the deletion of the will can be stated. 
However, ••• will can be deleted just in case ItTs presupposed that 
the event is"one that the speaker can be sure of. 1 · 
Vetter 1973:105 points out that if La.koff's formulation is 
correct then the sentences 
(2) 	 a. I'm not sure that the Yankees ple.y the Red 
Sox tomorrow. 
b. 	 I can't be sure whether the Yankees play the 
Red Sox tomorrow. 
•vould deny their own presupposition,' He concludes that 'rather 
than presupposing the event to be one the speaker can be sure 
about, it seems to me that the sentences without the~ immediate1y 
entail that the event is planned.' 
Prince ms. 1973 uses the term futurate for present-tense 
sentences that can occur with future time adverbials, a piece of 
terminology- I adopt here. She is particularly interested in 
progressive ruturate sentences, like {3d) below: 
(3) 	 a. The hostages will be trying to escape tomorrow 
until the very last minute. 
b. 	 The hostages are trying to escape tomorrow 
until the very last minute. 
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(3) c. Mary will he tokinr, J)relims next weekend. 
d. Mary is. t.e.ldnr, prelims next weekend. 
e. Mary Hill be taking :prelirns next weekend when 
you call. 
f. *Ma.rs is te.kinr; preliMs next weekend when you 
call. 
Prom examples like thene t she concludes that I if one derives futurate 
b~-~.P.f$ via will-deletion, it is clear that (1) additional biza~re 
conditions will have to be met, and (2) in certain cases, vill-
deletion is blocked.'l She then nronoses that no will-deletion 
transformation exists, but. rathe~ that 1 futurate l;e:In6 is derived 
frori1 an underlying structure contnininp, PLAN as its hieher predicate• 
and that simple future.te h.as 'DEFIMITE or CERTAIN as a highe:r :predicate.' 
Prince 1 then, disagrees lfith both Lakoff and Vetter on the 
mechanics of a will-deletion trans:f'orma.tion; however, she takes 
basically Lakof~'s notion of 'sureness' to derive simple futurate 
sentences, and Vetter's notion of a tpla.n 1 to derive progressive 
futuratc sentences. 
Jenkins 1972 takes an interpretivist view of the phenomena. 
He considers sentences like the ~ollowing: 
{4) a. *John kno~s the answer tomorrow. 
b. I hope that the Red Sox do well tomorrow. 
c. *I know that the Red Sox do well tomorrow. 
d. He 	 will be right back. 
e. *He is rieht back. 
~. It will: do you some good. 
g. *It 	does you some good. 
Commentine that .'in a. theory which countenances will-deletion one 
would expect all cases of ~ill ••• to be able to delete' (180), he 
maintains that tthere are ~derlying modals later deleted by 
transformational o~erations. Rather we ar~ue that in each case the 
specific implicit model interpretation of futurity is due to a rule 
of semantic interpretation' (17h). He does not, however, provide 
any :precise account of what those in:terpretutions are, and is, 
therefore, unable to account for the deviance of (4a), which problem 
he sets a.side (178). 
In this paper I consider only futurate sentences. Thus, I 
vil1 not be looking at such environments as !f. complements, POSS-inr; 
complements, and for-to complements, vhere no :!ill.2 can ever appear. 3 
I believe that these must receive a separate account from futurate 
sentences. 
My approach is to present a series of contrasts between futurate 
and future sentences. In so doing, I hope to isolate the ad4itione.l 
semantic characteristics or conditions Yhich distinguish the 
f'uturate class. The following a.re those conditions as I will develop 
them~ 
(A) 	 The entailment that a.t the time of the assertion 
the speaker believes that n current stnte of 
affairs exists, the future result of which is 
described in the surface fo?'Tll; 
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(B) 	 the entailment from the time a.dverbia..1 that there 
is a definite upper time bound for vhat is 
described.; 
(C) 	 the presupposition tha.t the speaker has no control 
over whether or not vhat described in the 
surface sentence will in fact result from the 
current state of affairs. 
1. Transformation or inte.112retive rule 
As is obvious :from my discussion of the literature, there is 
considerable controversy about whether there is a transformation 
or an interpretive rule involveQ; and, if it is a tra.nsformation 5 
whether there is eve:r 11 will deleted along with the higher material. 
I do not know which a.lte~ive is the correct one 1 but I believe 
that I can contribute the first step in the final analysis of' f'uturates 1 
no matter from what school that a.na.lysis cones, 
If a transfornation (be it pne that deletes will or one that 
deletes higher naterial) is the best explanation, then the structure 
vhich triggers that transformation must be specified in detail. If 
roy conditions accurately charncteri7.e the class of futurates, then 
those conditions must be represented in the deep structure. 
Alternatively, if an interpretive rule is involved, then the 
interpretations must be specified precisely. As ,Jenkins points out, 
if the interpretation simpl,v consir,ts of re-inserting the future 
auxiliary, then it would be expected that any sentence containing will 
should a.lso appear in futurate fo:rm, since the two would have identical 
interpretations. It must be reneMbered that interpretive rules 
perform an important formal function, mn:rking as deviant those 
sentences which have contradictory interpretations. Within this 
theory, then, my conditions, if correct, could be used as those 
interpretations. 
2. Condition A: current state or affairs 
The first semantic requirement is the entailment that at the time 
of the assertion the speaker believes that a current state of affairs 
exists, the future result of which is described in the surface fom. 
This claim can be brought out in severe.l ways. 
Consider first the sentences below. 
(5) a. Kurt will have a date vith Wanda. June tomorrov. 
b. Kurt has a date with Wanda June tomorrow. 
c. 	?Kurt l-Till have a da.te with Wanda June tomorrow., 
but he probably von't keep it~ 
d. 	 Kurt has a. date vith Wanda June tomorrow but he 
probably won't keep it. 
I chose the idiom to have a date deliberately, because it is ambip;uous 
in English in Just the right vey: under one reading,. it means to 
have a.n arrangement to go somevrhere with someone, while under the 
other it means actually to go. ' 
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Sentence {5e.) is ambiguous betveen the assertion that arranee-
ments for a date between Kurt and Wanda June will be made tomorroY, 
and the assertion that arrangements have already been made for them 
to go somewhere toBether tomorrow. In my speech the first of these 
two readings is ver:r much preferred. Sentence (5b), however, has 
only the second of these two readings. It asserts that the current 
state of affairs is that there is an arrangement between Kurt a.~d Wanda 
June that they vill be together tomorrow. 
The above distinction between the readin~s is brought out 
especially vell by {5c) and {5d). In my speech the preferred reading 
for (5c) seems to be that Kurt both will and will probably not take 
Wanda. June out., which is contradictory. I cnn~ however, get the 
other rea.ding--elearly expressed in (5d)--in which Kurt has an 
a.rra.ngement with Wanda June but probably von't honor it. 
As further evidence for the first condition, consider the 
:following: 
(6) a. I don't know whether or not the Yankees will 
{be playing} 
pla.y the Red Sox tomorrow. 
b. I don't knov whether or not the Yankees 
{are pla.,.ving} 
pley 
the Red Sox tomorrow. 
e. I don't know whether or not the Yankees will 
1be playing} 
play 
the Red Sox tomorrow, because it 
may rain. 
d. *I don't know whether or not the Yankees 
{are playing} the Red 
pla.y 
Sox tomorrow, because it 
may rain. 
e. I don 1 t kr.ow whether or not the Yankees will 
b 1 .{ e P aying} the Red Sox tomorrow because tomorrow
1J) ey 
is Memorial Dey. 
f. I don't know whether or not the Yankees 
{are playing} the Red Sox tomorrov because 
pla.y 
tomor:rov is Memorial Day. 
g. The Yankees {are playine} the Red Sox tomorrow, play 
if it doesn 1 t rain. 
In (6a) a.nd (6e) there are two possible readings, one of which is 
that the speaker does not know whether or not the game is scheduled 
and the other of vhich is that he does not know if the game vill 
e.ctua.lly occur. The corresponding sentences (6b) and (6:t'} have. only 
the first or these readin~s. They are perfectly acceptable because 
the scheduling is noncontingent--i.e. the fact that tomorrow is 
Memorial Day did or did not affect the scheduling of the game. 
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The sentences (6c) end {6d), on the other hand, can on1y be 
said to express o. continnency ·abol.;lt vhethe;t:' or not the game v:i.li 
actua.l.ly occur~ and not about whether or not the f,ame is scheduled. 
Thus, (6c) has the second readin~ of (6a) and (6e),while (6d} is 
deviant because that reading is not in accord with condition A, 
notice that in (6g) the outcome of the schedule is itself' asserted 
to be contfogent upon whether or not it is raining; (6g} is therefore 
acceptable. 
The principle being invoked here is that a current state of 
affairs cannot be contingent upon a future state of affairs {althouch 
the current state of affairs can be such that its outco~e is contingent 
upon some future state). This relationship can be brought out in 
another We;J by examining sentences like 
__,, 	 ~. . 11 {be defeating} th Rd S(7) 	 a, The Y-=ees n 1 defeat , e e ,ox 
tor.iorro.r. 
b. *The Yankees car:e~=~~ating} the Red Sox tomorrow. 
c. The Yankees vill {be pleying} well tomorrow. 
pla.v 
{are playing}d. 	*The Yank9es la ~ell tomorrow. 
. . . P Y {a.re defeating}e. 	 It is prearranged that the Yanke~s ?defeat 
.the Red. Sox tomorrow. · 
In {7n.} a prediction is being me.de a.bout the outcome of the gwne. 
The outcome of the game is a future event contingent upon the way 
in which the game is played, which is future vith regard to the 
assertion; consequer,,tly {7b) is 6ut, since it cannot pertain to a. 
current state of aftairs. Similarly, (7c) is contingent upon the 
state of the Yankees during the game and cannot, therefore, be 
expressing a current state of affairs. {7d) is thus deviant, and I 
can think of no context to nak.e it acceptable. · 
The sentence pair represent;ed in (7e) is particularly interesting 
and il'ltport~t. The simple futurate form is possibly acceptable, though 
in my speech it is questionable. If it is acceptable, it seems to 
be seying that the outcome of the ·game, the event being described, 
has somehow been prearranged. It is hal'd for me to imagine how a 
future event as such can be prearranged;; as a result, I find the 
simple futurate fonn to be veey doubtful. The :ruturate progressive 
form, on the·other hand, sounds perfectly good to me, It seems to 
be describing the prearrangement itself t rather than· the event which 
is yet to occur. As such, then. the futurate progressive ~orm is 
describing a currently extant state of a~fairs and is, therefore, 
in accord vitb condition A. In contrast,, the simple futura.te is not 
fully in accord with condition A because it doesn't describe (in a 
direct vq, at any rate) a current state of affairs. 
2.1. 	 The notion of a pla.n 
It is basically the above data, with the possible exception 
of (7e)t which ied Vetter to conclude that futurate sentences must 
describe planned events. Additional data of the·type in (7e) caused 
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Prince to sey that only futurate progressive sentences had a 
higher predicate PLAN. As I will now show, the notion of a pl~n 
is far too narrow to account for all the instances of English 
fu.turate sentences, be they simple or progressive. 
Taking the claim quite literally, the predicate PW{ requires 
a subject, thour,h this subject is apparently alvays deleted or lost 
in the interpretation of the surface sentence. Now consider: 
(8) a. The sun vill {be ;gtting} at 8:39 tomorrow. 
b. The sun {is !!i~ing} at 8:39 tomorrow. 
c. An eclipse vill {be occurring} occur 
tomorrow norning. 
d. .An eclipse {is occurring}occu~s .tomorrow morning. 
e. • be rainingIt will { rain '} tomorrow. 
To retain the predicate PL.Ali for {8b) and (8d), an appeal to the 
notion of a divine planner would have to be made. It makes no sense 
to say that physical laws plan the movement of the heavens. Thus, 
it might be said that these futurate sentences are acceptable because 
there is n divine plan controlling the movement of the heavens. The 
same divine plan, however, could also be said to control the changes 
in climate. if I remember my religion correctly. The issue would 
not then seen to be the existence of a plBnt but rather whether or 
not the speaker has knowledge of the workings of that plan. I showed 
in sentence set (6}, hovever, that speaker knowledge of the details 
of a plan is not required to allow futurate forms to appear. The 
notion of~ plan then 9 when combined vith the fact that (80) and (8d) 
are acceptable vhile (Bf} is deviant, would seem to yield a 
contradiction. 
Under my formulation no notion of plan is required. 1 must 
merely appeal to the fact that the ,position of the sun and the moon 
are believed to be predictable by current technology~ while the state 
of the Yeather is not believed to be predictable. Thus, given any 
current state of the heavens, s.ny future state ia believed to be 
completely determined. This belief on the part of speakers is 
sufficient to allow futurate forms of type (8b) and (8d) under my 
formulation. But people have no such belief about the predictability 
of the weather, so that stB.tements like {8f} about future weather 
conditions are prohibited. Notice that (8f) could be made perf'ectly 
acceptable if we imagine that it is or~ered in a different vorld--
sey on the moon, where the weather man, rather than predicting the 
weather, pulls levers that control the climate in the dome. 
2.2. The notion of an event 
According to the ~omu.lations given by both Vetter and La.koff, 
futurate sentences describe events, though the notion of~ is 
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undefined. From en intuitive standpoint, however, it appears that 
nry contention, that what is described must merely be something 
which the speaker believes can result from a previous state of affairs, 
is broader than·the contention that these sentences r:;u.5t describe 
events. 
Consider the following futurate sentences: 
(9} a. I am busy tornorro~. 
b. I can't see you tomorrow. 
c. The computer is down tomorrow. 
Each of these sentences is clearly stative. To test this, consider 
that each could be the sub,,ect ·of seems and none could be the object 
of force. I see no wey in which t~ould be said to describe 
events, even in the broadest interpr~tation of that term. Rather~ 
each describes a. state vhich will result fror.i some stnte of affairs 
currently obtaining: hence, each is perfectly acceptable. 
2.3. The notion of c~r:,!Jn~y or sureness 
I nov exrunine the contention that the occurrence of futurate 
sentences is in some 'Way dependent on spea.\er sureness or certainty. 
Lakoff s~s that this notion must be presupposed, and Prince says 
that it appears .as a higher predicate in simple futurate sentences. 
I will nov show that no such notion is necessary. 
Considering first the cla.irn tha.t this suren-ess is presupposed, 
it vould follow that those environments in vhich the sentence is 
presupposed to.be true would be ideal for futurate sentences. Factive 
verbs are known to supply such envirorm.ents in their complements. 
Butcomp~e · 
(10} a., It's too ba.d that the Yankees vill {bepi;yeying} 
well tomorrow. 
{are playing}b. *It's too bad that the Yankees play
well tomorrow. 
For sentence (10b) the speaker presupposes that the complement 
sentence is true; therefore, it should follow that the futurate form 
is acceptable. But it is deviant. In fact~ the distribution of 
futurates within complements of fa.ctives is practically identical 
to their distribution in nonfactive environments. I vill leave it 
to the reader to verify this fact for himself. This fa.ct agrues 
against the claim that sureness is presupposed. 
That no higher predicate of the form CERTAI?l or DEFINITE, as 
proposed by Prince, need be present can be seen by examining again 
sentence sets (2) and (6). In those sets there are futurate simple 
_sentences o.s complements of nee;ated be sure arid know. The clain 
that these futurate simple sentences have a hiBher predicate CERTArn 
would entail that CERTAIN could be dominated by its ow negation, 
which vould be a contra.diction. This difficulty argues against the 
higher predicate analysis. 
83  
3. Condition B: a definite upper time bound 
The second sern.e.ntic condition in my formulation is that a time 
adverbial must s~ecify a definite upper time bound for what is 
described. As a first derr~nstration of this ~rinciple consider 
the contrast between until, pefore, and kl_ in the followin~ sentences. 
(11) a. The computer will be down until 10:00 tomorrow, 
b. The computer is dmrn until 10:00 tomorrow. 
c. The computer will be down before 10:00 tomorrow. 
d. ?'rhe computer is down before J0:00 tornorro'I.'. 
e. The computer vill be down by 10:00 tomorrow. 
f. *The computer is down by 10:00 tomorrow. 
To describe the differences between the above three time adverbials 
in general let T be some fixed point in future time and P(t} be 
some proposition whose truth is predicated over time. Then 
P(t) until T means that P(t) is true if and only if tis 
not later than T; 
P(t) before T means that if tis earlier than T, then 
P(t} is true; 
P(t) .2i. T means that if P(t) is false then tis earlier 
than T. 
Applying this formali.sm to the sentences in (11), we see that 
in (lla) the assertion is me.de that the s'ta.te will la.st no later than 
10:00 tomorrow. There is a. clear upper time bound asserted, and 
consequently (llb) is acceptable. In (llc) the assertion is made 
that the state will obtain at a time earlier than 10:00 and no 
assertion is mn.de about any time after that. (lld) is, therefore, 
marginally acceptable, and does seem to imply that the computer 
will no longer be down after 10:00. (lle), however, clearly asserts 
that the state will come into being prior to or at 10:00. The 
implication that the state will continue beyond 10:00 is ~resent, so 
that (llf) is deviant. 
3,1, Retentive nredicates 
To extend the analysis slightly, notice that there is a class 
of predicates in English whose properties, once a.scribed to an 
individual, are assumed to be retained by that individual for an 
indefinite period into the future--for instance, knowing the answer 
and being dead. Once someone knows an answer he is assumed to kno~ 
it for an indefinite period into the future, and once someone is dead 
he is assumed to be permanently dead. I do not mean that the 
property cannot be lost, only that the normal assumption is that 
it is retained indefinitely into the future. I will term these 
predicates retentive. It is the existence of retentive predicates, 
among other things, that caused Jenkins to conclude that no trans-
formation could be specified to account for futurate sentences, 
The behavior of retentive predicates with regard to~. before, 
and El, is the precise inverse of that of futurate sentences, as can 
be seen in the following sentences. 
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(12) a. *John knew the answer until 10:00. 
b. *John was dead until 10:00. 
c. John knew the answer before 10:00. 
d. John was dead before 10:00. 
e. John kne'W' the answer by 10:00. 
f. John was dead by 10:00. 
Thus, the~ sentences are deviant and the EX.. sentences are 
acceptable. The before sentences ere acceptable but cannot have 
the reading that the state described no longer pertained after 10:00. 
In conclusion, since the retentive predicates cannot be upward 
time bounded, their ruturate forms should be deviant, vhich is 
correct: 
(13) a. John will know the answer tomorrow, 
b. *John knows the answer tomorrov. 
c. John will be dead tomorrov. 
d. *John is 	dead tomorro\l', 
Neither the 	notion of certainty nor the notion of plan can account 
for the facts in (13), since the attainment of these predicates 
can be both planned and eertain--as in the ease of studying all 
night to learn the answer, or o:r having terminal cancer. 
3.2, Present perfect forms as retentive predicates 
Vetter points out that will never deletes in the future perfect. 
This is just what ve vould expect, given the observations in the 
preceding section. Sentences like 
(14) 	 a. It seems that the Yankees have played the 
Red Sox. 
b. *I forced the Yankees to have played the Red Sox. 
c. _It seems that the computer has been dovn. 
d. *I caused the computer to have been down. 
shov that the present perfect sentences e.re stative. In addition, 
these states are retentive, since once the Yankees have played the 
Red Sox it will always be the case that they played them, a.nd once 
the computer has been do'W'Il it is always the case that it vas down 
then. It rollovs then that since present perfect verb forms are 
retentive predicates, they cannot have futurate surface realizations: 
(15} a. The Yankees will have played the Red Sox 
tomorrow. 
b, 4 The Yankees have played the Red Sox tomorrow. 
c. The computer will have been down tomorrow. 
d. *The computer has been do'Wtl tomorrov. 
3,3. The adverbial in a moment 
Another importanl. datum tna.t lends strong support to the 
formulation of condition B has to do vith the relationship of 
achievement versus nonachieveI!l.ent verbs to the future time adverbial 
in a moment. This adverbial describes an extremely narrow time 
bound, but is nonetheless still clearly a future time adverbial 
under one reading, Given condition B. then, we would expect that 
in a moment would be very restricted in its appearance in futurate 
sentences,, This is in fact the case. 
Doltti 1973b presents four classes of verbs--describing states, 
activities, accomplishments, and achievements. Under his analysis, 
only achievement verbs have a COME ABOUT as the highest verb in 
their remote structure representation. That is, only achievement 
verbs represent a change of state at the moment of their realization. 
~hus, only achievement verbs would seem to guarantee an upper time 
bound, and ve would then expect only achievement verbs to occur in 
futurate sentences with the adverbial in a moment. Note the following 
contrasts: 
j 
STATE 
(16) a. The computer is do'Wil tomorrov. 
b. *The computer is down in a moment. 
ACTIVITY  
! 
I 
c. The Yankees play the Red Sox tomorrow.  
d. *The Yankees play the Red Sox in a moment.I 
Accm:fPLISHMENT 
e. Nixon delivers a Watergate speech tomorrow. 
f. *lUxon delivers a Watergate speech in a moment. 
ACHIEVEMENT 
g. Dean begins his testimony tomorrow. 
j b. Dean begins his testimony in a moment. 
Onlylwith achievement verbs is the described state completed 
at the point in time to vhich it is ascribed. Thus, the moment that 
Dean actually begins to testify, the state of beginning his testimony 
is completed. Thus, only achievement verbs can occur in futurate 
sentences with in a moment. As additional evidence, notice that 
sentence (l6d) has a nonactivity re$ding (in vhich the game will 
begin in e. moment), a.nd that this reading is acceptable. 
3.4. 	 Indefinite future time adverbials  
As a result of the progressive forms or the folloving sentences  
( 17) a.. Mary rill { !!k;eking } prelims next veeke.nd 
when you call. 
Y,. * Mary {is taking} prelims next 'Week when you
takes 
call, 
c. Joe vi11 {be cokoking} dinner tomorrow vhen 
coo  
he's unexpectedly shot.  
d. * Joe {is cookking} dinner tomorrov vhen he's 
coos 
unexpectedly shot. 
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(17) e. Sue vil1 {be moving} the lawn tomorrow when 
rnov 
she discovers the body. 
f. *Sue {is mowing} the la'lrn tomorrow when she 
mows 
discovers the body. 
and the apparent problems ussociuted with predicting their occurrence, 
Prince decides that the futw-ate be-ing must be derived from a 
higher PLAN predicate. But she completely fails to notice that the 
same restriction applies to simple futurate sentences as to 
progressive futurate sentences. As a result, her contention that 
the two must have separate sources no longer seems correct. 
The significant characteristic of (17), and of most of Prince 1 s 
other examples, is that they contain an indefinite future time 
adverbial. The times when the call will be made or when the body 
will be found are not knovn and are therefore indefinite. The 
unacceptability of (l7b), (17d), and (17f) then follows directly 
fro~ my condition B, which says that there must be a definite upper 
time bound. Notice that each sentence also contains a specific 
binding time phrase, such as next veek or tomorrov, and that these 
combined with after (rather than when) would make (17b), (17d), arid 
(17f) all acceptable. ~-
3.S. 	 Some special idioms 
Jenkins observes that there are some special idioms in 
English which ce.n never appear as futurates: 
(18) 	 a . He vill be right back. 
b. .tii:e is right back. 
C • It will do you some good, 
d. *It does you some good. 
e. It (the svea.ter) Vil! do, 
f. WJ:t (the svee.ter) does. 
He concludes that anyone advocating a transformational approach 
to futurates would have to mark these idioms as not undergoing the 
rule, Such marking would not be necessary vith an interpretive rule. 
As (18h) shows, the problem with (18b) derives 
(18) 	 g. He will be back in a moment.  
h, *He is back in a moment.  
from the fact that right back is the same type of adverbial as 
in a moment--1.e. it requires that a change o~ state occur at the 
moment of its realization; therefore, {18b) is completely predictable 
from condition B. 
In the case of (18c) and (18e)t both the do predicates are 
retentive. Therefore, (18d) and (18f) a.re regular. The fact that 
these idioms cannot appear in ruturate form does not require marking. 
87  
4. Condition C; No speaker control 
The third and last condition is that futurate sentences have 
the presupposition that the speaker hns no control over whether or 
npt what is described in the surface sentence will in fact result 
from the current state of affairs. That an additional restriction 
of th~ above type is needed can be seen from the sentence pairs in 
{19). 4 
(19) 	 a. Kurt has a date with Wanda June tomorrow. 
b, I have a date with Wanda June tomorrow. 
c. Kurt dates Wanda June tomorrow. 
d,?*I date Wanda June tomorrow. 
The problem is that (19d) is odd, whereas (19c), whei"e the 
speaker is not the subject, and {19b), where a sli~htly different 
assertion is being made by the speaker about himself, are perfectly 
acceptable. As it turns out, there are analogous phenomena. 
In (20), (20a) is acceptable while (2Gb} is deviant. 
(20) 	 a. John believes it's raininR out even though 
it's not. 
b. 	*I believe it's raining out even though it's 
not. 
The contrast derives from the fact that simple assertions presuppose 
that the speaker believes them to be true. Consequently, (20a) has 
among its entailments: 
(21) 	 a. John believes it 1 s rainin~ out. 
b. The speaker believes it's not raininv, out. 
These entailments are in no way incompatible. They simply involve 
a disagreement between two individuals. (20b), howevert has (22), 
(22) 	 The speaker believes it's rainin~ out. 
instead of (21a), as one of its entailments. {20b) then involves 
the contradiction that the speaker both does and doesn't believe 
that it's raining. Hence the deviance of (20b). 
It is my contention that a similar type of contradiction causes 
the deviance in (19d). Notice first of all that having a date for 
some future time differs from dating at some future time in that 
in the first, all arrangements have already been made, vhile in the 
second, action on the part of the participants is required for the 
action to be realized. (19d) is then different from the other 
three sentences in that only (19d) requires that the speaker perform 
some action after the time of the assertion and before the time of 
the achievement of the state described. Only (l9d) is contingent 
upon future speaker action. 
My hypothesis, then, is that for a futurate sentence to be 
acceptable, vhat is described by that sentence must be presupposed 
not to be contingent upon future speaker actions, If this 
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presupposition is present, then an argument similar to the one 
about (20b) could be made to show that of the sentences in (19}, 
(19d) and only (19d) denies its ovn presupJ)-Ositions and is, therefore, 
deviant. 
As further evidence for condition C, consider (23). 
(23) 	 e.. Dean testifies before the Senate Watergate 
committee tomorrow. 
b. 	 [ ••. as asserted by Senator Ervin, the chairman 
of the committee] 
c. [ ••. as asserted by Dan Rather, n CBS reporter] 
(23c) seems to be merely reporting the racts, while (23b) seems to 
be insisting that the testimony will be given. 
Again, the contrast can be explained by reference to analogous 
phenomena. Consider the contrast in the following two sentences: 
(24) 	 a. It's too bad that John hates you. 
b. It's too bad that I hate you. 
The that-clause in these two sentences is presumed by the speaker 
to be true. In (24a) the speaker is assuming something to be true 
over vhich he has no control; consequently, the sentence seems 
perfectly natural. In ( 24b) , however, the speaker is asserting 
that something about himselr which he assumes is true and over which 
he presumably has control, is too bad, so that (24b) has a funny 
flavor. 
Similarly, in (23b} by Condition C, Ervin presumes that he can 
do nothing about the fact that Dean must testify, Since Ervin 
could in fact cancel Dean's testimony, (23b) amounts to an 
insistence on Ervin's part that he refuses to do so. 
5. Conclusion 
Without couching my analysis within any specific school, I 
have presented three semantic conditions which must be present 
for a sentence to appear in futurate fo:rm. To the best of my 
knowledge, the conditions account for all the distributional 
characteristics of these sentences. 
Footnotes 
*This paper vas originally ..ritten for a syntax course in 
the spring of 1972 taught by Michael Geis, vho spent many hours 
with me on this paper and provided many of the insights--especially 
condition C. I would also like to thank David Do~-ty end Jerrold 
Sadock for their help and comments on the first version, and 
Arnold Zwicky for his help and comments on this version. 
l. Prince also notices that exwnples like 
( :!. ) The plane was exploding at 2 p .r.:. until the r.mney 
vas delivered at noon. 
(ii) 	"The plane would be exploding at 2 p.m. until the 
money vas delivered at noon. 
show that in some environments the will can never be present. A 
f,reat denl of her analysis pertains to past forms of will, and it 
may be that her notion of PLAN for this class of sent~s is correct. 
2. I~ should be :pointed out that there are t~o wills in English--
the volitional will and the future will. My discussion concerns 
only the futU't"e vill. Volitional will may appear in if-comµlements. 
3, One other set of constructions which I will not examine is 
in the complements of hope and the imperatives of such verbs as 
assume, suppose, ima5ine. It is my belief that even a third process 
is going on here, havinf, to do vith the fact that with these 
complements no assertion whatsoever is being rr..e.de a.bout the actual. 
state-of the vorld. That is, one can hope for~ or commend someone 
to imagine, anything whatsoever, includinR round squares. 
4. These facts were first pointed out to me by Micha.el Geis. 
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